Choosing How to Regulate

61 Pages Posted: 16 Apr 2004

See all articles by Andrew P. Morriss

Andrew P. Morriss

Bush School of Government & Public Service / School of Law; PERC - Property and Environment Research Center

Bruce Yandle

Clemson University - John E. Walker Department of Economics

Andrew Dorchak

Case Western Reserve University Law Library

Date Written: April 2004

Abstract

In this Article, the authors survey how agencies create substantive regulations through traditional rulemaking, negotiated rulemaking and litigation. Using public choice analysis, the Article relates agency choice to the agency's incentive structure. The Article also shows how the different forms of regulatory activity influence the content of agency regulations. Using a case study of EPA's regulation of heavy duty diesel engines, the Article examines EPA's choices over 30 years as a means of testing the proposed theory. Finally, the Article concludes with a critique of allowing agencies to choose how they will regulate because it allows agencies to evade constraints imposed by Congress and the President and so diminishes political accountability.

JEL Classification: K23, K32

Suggested Citation

Morriss, Andrew P. and Yandle, Thomas and Dorchak, Andrew, Choosing How to Regulate (April 2004). Case Legal Studies Research Paper No. 04-3, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=530163 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.530163

Andrew P. Morriss (Contact Author)

Bush School of Government & Public Service / School of Law ( email )

4220 TAMU / Room 2141
2129 Allen Building
College Station, TX 77843-4220
United States

PERC - Property and Environment Research Center

2048 Analysis Drive
Suite A
Bozeman, MT 59718
United States

Thomas Yandle

Clemson University - John E. Walker Department of Economics ( email )

Clemson, SC 29634
United States
864-656-3970 (Phone)
864-656-4192 (Fax)

Andrew Dorchak

Case Western Reserve University Law Library ( email )

11075 East Boulevard
Cleveland, OH 44106
United States

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