Choosing How to Regulate

61 Pages Posted: 16 Apr 2004  

Andrew P. Morriss

Texas A&M School of Law; PERC - Property and Environment Research Center; George Mason University - Mercatus Center

Bruce Yandle

Clemson University - John E. Walker Department of Economics

Andrew Dorchak

Case Western Reserve University Law Library

Date Written: April 2004

Abstract

In this Article, the authors survey how agencies create substantive regulations through traditional rulemaking, negotiated rulemaking and litigation. Using public choice analysis, the Article relates agency choice to the agency's incentive structure. The Article also shows how the different forms of regulatory activity influence the content of agency regulations. Using a case study of EPA's regulation of heavy duty diesel engines, the Article examines EPA's choices over 30 years as a means of testing the proposed theory. Finally, the Article concludes with a critique of allowing agencies to choose how they will regulate because it allows agencies to evade constraints imposed by Congress and the President and so diminishes political accountability.

JEL Classification: K23, K32

Suggested Citation

Morriss, Andrew P. and Yandle, Bruce and Dorchak, Andrew, Choosing How to Regulate (April 2004). Case Legal Studies Research Paper No. 04-3. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=530163 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.530163

Andrew P. Morriss (Contact Author)

Texas A&M School of Law ( email )

1515 Commerce Street
Fort Worth, TX 76133
United States

PERC - Property and Environment Research Center ( email )

2048 Analysis Drive
Suite A
Bozeman, MT 59718
United States

George Mason University - Mercatus Center ( email )

3434 Washington Blvd., 4th Floor
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

Thomas Yandle

Clemson University - John E. Walker Department of Economics ( email )

Clemson, SC 29634
United States
864-656-3970 (Phone)
864-656-4192 (Fax)

Andrew Dorchak

Case Western Reserve University Law Library ( email )

11075 East Boulevard
Cleveland, OH 44106
United States

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