Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

Time Value Expropriation and Convertible Bonds Calls

Incontri di Finanza Aziendale, pp. 1-11, Egea, Milan, 2002

17 Pages Posted: 17 Apr 2004  

Emanuele Bajo

University of Bologna - Department of Management

Abstract

Most of convertible bonds are issued with a callability provision. This allows the issuer to redeem the bond before the maturity date, when, doubtlessly, this is economically convenient for the firm. According to Ingersoll's theory, this condition occurs as soon as convertible value reaches call price. As Ingersoll and many others scholars afterward noticed, although this is the optimal behavior, generally firms delay calls until the bond price is, in average, more than 40% above the call price, giving so a unjustified gift to bondholders. In the last 20 years several possible explanations in the literature have been proposed.

Looking at Italian experience, very few calls has been announced in the last years. To verify if this phenomenon can be considered as a strong inefficiency of Italian firms, I investigated a 14 years window, taking the whole universe of convertible bonds listed at Milan Stock Exchange from 1985 to 1998. In my sample of 85 convertible bond issues, I tested main existing theories, following a similar analysis conducted by Asquith (1995). However, a more complete explanation of call policies has been reached when we added in the analysis a new hypothesis: time value expropriation.

Keywords: Convertible Bonds, Financial Structure, Options

JEL Classification: G10, G14, G32

Suggested Citation

Bajo, Emanuele, Time Value Expropriation and Convertible Bonds Calls. Incontri di Finanza Aziendale, pp. 1-11, Egea, Milan, 2002. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=531622

Emanuele Bajo (Contact Author)

University of Bologna - Department of Management ( email )

Via Capo di lucca, 34
Bologna, 40126
Italy
+39 051 209 8091 (Phone)
+39 051 246411 (Fax)

Paper statistics

Downloads
248
Rank
103,742
Abstract Views
2,216