Top Executives, Turnover, and Firm Performance in Germany

Posted: 3 May 2000

See all articles by Steven N. Kaplan

Steven N. Kaplan

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); University of Chicago - Polsky Center for Entrepreneurship

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Abstract

This article examines executive turnover--for both management and supervisory boards--and its relation to firm performance in the largest companies in Germany in the 1980s. Turnover of the management board increases significantly with poor stock performance and particularly poor (i.e., negative) earnings, but is unrelated to sales growth and earnings growth. These turnover performance relations do not vary with measures of stock ownership and bank voting power. Supervisory board appointments andturnover also increase with poor stock performance, but are unrelated to other measures of performance.

JEL Classification: G12, G32

Suggested Citation

Kaplan, Steven Neil, Top Executives, Turnover, and Firm Performance in Germany. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization: Volume 10 Number 1, April 1994., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5327

Steven Neil Kaplan (Contact Author)

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