Political Pressure Deflection

48 Pages Posted: 4 May 2004 Last revised: 12 Jul 2010

See all articles by James E. Anderson

James E. Anderson

Boston College - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Maurizio Zanardi

University of Surrey - School of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 2004

Abstract

Much economic policy is deliberately shifted away from direct political processes to administrative processes --- political pressure deflection. Pressure deflection poses a puzzle to standard political economy models which suggest that having policies to `sell' is valuable to politicians. The puzzle is solved here by showing that incumbents will favor pressure deflection since it can deter viability of a challenger, essentially like entry deterrence. U.S. trade policy since 1934 provides a prime example, especially antidumping law and its evolution.

Suggested Citation

Anderson, James E. and Zanardi, Maurizio, Political Pressure Deflection (April 2004). NBER Working Paper No. w10439, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=532998

James E. Anderson (Contact Author)

Boston College - Department of Economics ( email )

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Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Cambridge, MA 02138
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Maurizio Zanardi

University of Surrey - School of Economics ( email )

Guildford, Surrey GU2 7XH
United Kingdom

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