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Does Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns? An Examination of Firm Operating Performance and Investors' Expectations

51 Pages Posted: 21 Apr 2004  

John E. Core

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

Wayne R. Guay

University of Pennsylvania - Accounting Department

Tjomme O. Rusticus

University of Minnesota

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 2004

Abstract

We investigate Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick's (2003) finding that firms with weak shareholder rights exhibit significant stock market underperformance. If the relation between poor governance and poor returns is causal, we expect that the market is negatively surprised by the poor operating performance of weak governance firms. We find that firms with weak shareholder rights exhibit significant operating underperformance. However, analysts' forecast errors and earnings announcement returns show no evidence that this underperformance surprises the market. Our results are robust to controls for takeover activity. Overall, our results do not support the hypothesis that weak governance causes poor stock returns.

This is a revised version of a paper previously titled 'Does Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns? An Examination of Firm Operating Performance and Analysts' Expectations' that was originally posted on April 21, 2004.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Market Efficiency, Analysts

JEL Classification: G12, G14, G34, G29

Suggested Citation

Core, John E. and Guay, Wayne R. and Rusticus, Tjomme O., Does Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns? An Examination of Firm Operating Performance and Investors' Expectations (September 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=533582 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.533582

John E. Core

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )

100 Main Street
E62-416
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Wayne R. Guay

University of Pennsylvania - Accounting Department ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
1329 Steinberg-Dietrich Hall
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States
215-898-7775 (Phone)
215-573-2054 (Fax)

Tjomme O. Rusticus (Contact Author)

University of Minnesota ( email )

Carlson School of Management
321 19th Avenue South, Room 3-122
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

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