Lobbying, Information Transmission and Unequal Representation

31 Pages Posted: 21 Apr 2004

See all articles by Johan N. M. Lagerlöf

Johan N. M. Lagerlöf

University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics

Lars Frisell

Sveriges Riksbank

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 2004

Abstract

We study the effects of unequal representation in the interest-group system on the degree of information transmission between a lobbyist and a policy-maker. Employing a dynamic cheap-talk model in which the lobbyist cares instrumentally about his reputation for truth telling, we show that the larger the inequality, the less information can credibly be transmitted to the policy-maker. We also investigate the effects of inequality on welfare, and discuss the welfare effects of institutions that increase transparency but which, as an unintended side effect, lower the lobbyist's incentives for truth telling.

Keywords: Lobbying, interest groups, reputation, information transmission, representation, inequality, bias

JEL Classification: D72, D78, D82

Suggested Citation

Lagerlof, Johan N. M. and Frisell, Lars, Lobbying, Information Transmission and Unequal Representation (March 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=533961

Johan N. M. Lagerlof (Contact Author)

University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics ( email )

Øster Farimagsgade 5
Bygning 26
1353 Copenhagen K.
Denmark

HOME PAGE: http://www.johanlagerlof.com/

Lars Frisell

Sveriges Riksbank ( email )

S-103 37 Stockholm
Sweden

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