Financing New Investments Under Asymmetric Information: A General Approach

CIRPEE Working Paper No. 04-07

33 Pages Posted: 23 Apr 2004

See all articles by Robin Boadway

Robin Boadway

Queen's University; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques Economiques et l'Emploi (CIRPEE)

Michael Keen

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Fiscal Affairs Department; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)

Date Written: April 2004

Abstract

We study the efficiency of credit market equilibria when financial intermediaries cannot observe the riskiness or the returns of potential investment projects. With loan financing, there is over-investment in high-return, high-risk projects and under-investment in low-return, low-risk projects relative to the social optimum. If firms have the choice of equity finance, there is unambiguously over-investment under reasonable conditions. The well-known cases of Stiglitz and Weiss and of de Meza and Webb emerge as special cases. Policy implications are considered, and the results are extended to allow for signaling and screening equilibria.

Keywords: Credit Markets, Asymmetric Information

JEL Classification: G14, G18

Suggested Citation

Boadway, Robin and Keen, Michael, Financing New Investments Under Asymmetric Information: A General Approach (April 2004). CIRPEE Working Paper No. 04-07. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=534483 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.534483

Robin Boadway (Contact Author)

Queen's University ( email )

99 University Avenue
Kingston K7L 3N6, Ontario
Canada
613-533-2266 (Phone)
613-533-6668 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/pub/faculty/boadway/

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques Economiques et l'Emploi (CIRPEE)

Ste-Foy, Quebec G1K 7P4
Canada

Michael Keen

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Fiscal Affairs Department ( email )

700 19th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)

7 Ridgmount Street
London, WC1E 7AE
United Kingdom

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