Railway (De)Regulation: A European Efficiency Comparison

49 Pages Posted: 3 May 2004

See all articles by Guido Friebel

Guido Friebel

Goethe University Frankfurt; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Marc Ivaldi

Toulouse School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Catherine Vibes

University of Toulouse 1 - Centre Interuniversitaire de Calcul de Toulouse (CICT)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 2004

Abstract

Many European countries have sought to increase the efficiency of national railroad companies through a range of reforms: separating infrastructure and operations, creating independent regulatory institutions and providing access to the network to third parties. To estimate the effects of reforms on railroad efficiency, we investigate a new World Bank panel dataset that covers many EU countries over a period of 20 years. We compare the passenger traffic efficiency of national railroad companies by means of a production frontier model and evaluate the effects of reforms on efficiency. We find that reforms have efficiency-increasing effects but that the effect of reforms depends on sequencing: the introduction of multiple reforms in a package has at best neutral effects, but sequential reforms improve efficiency. Using the LISREL technique, we find that our results are robust against potential problems of endogeneity.

Keywords: Production frontier, network industries, panel data analysis, passenger and freight traffic

JEL Classification: C23, D24, L51, L92

Suggested Citation

Friebel, Guido and Ivaldi, Marc and Vibes, Catherine, Railway (De)Regulation: A European Efficiency Comparison (March 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=536162

Guido Friebel (Contact Author)

Goethe University Frankfurt ( email )

Gr├╝neburgplatz 1
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Marc Ivaldi

Toulouse School of Economics ( email )

Manufacture des Tabacs
21 Allee de Brienne bat. F
Toulouse Cedex, F-31000
France
+33 5 61 12 8592 (Phone)
+33 5 61 12 8637 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Catherine Vibes

University of Toulouse 1 - Centre Interuniversitaire de Calcul de Toulouse (CICT) ( email )

118, route de Narbonne
Toulouse Cedex 4, F-31062
France

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
24
Abstract Views
4,462
PlumX Metrics