A Simple Model of Optimal Hate Crime Legislation

26 Pages Posted: 18 May 2004  

Li Gan

Texas A&M University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Roberton C. Williams III

University of Maryland - Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Resources for the Future

Thomas Wiseman

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2004

Abstract

We present a simple model of the effects of hate crime legislation. It shows that even if the direct harm to victims of hate crime is the same as for other crimes, because of other differences in the effects it may still be optimal to exert more law-enforcement effort to deter or prevent hate crime. These differences also have previously unrecognized effects on the optimal level of effort by potential hate crime victims to avoid being victimized, thus affecting the efficiency of government policies that encourage or discourage such effort. We discuss the implications of these results for optimal hate-crime policy, as well as for policy toward other similar crimes, such as terrorism.

Suggested Citation

Gan, Li and Williams, Roberton C. and Wiseman, Thomas, A Simple Model of Optimal Hate Crime Legislation (May 2004). NBER Working Paper No. w10463. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=537808

Li Gan (Contact Author)

Texas A&M University - Department of Economics ( email )

5201 University Blvd.
College Station, TX 77843-4228
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Roberton C. Williams III

University of Maryland - Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics ( email )

Symmons Hall, Rm 2200
University of Maryland
College Park, MD 20742-5535
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.nber.org/cgi-bin/familyinfo.pl?a=a&user=roberton_williams

Resources for the Future ( email )

1616 P Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States

Thomas Wiseman

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics ( email )

Austin, TX 78712
United States

Paper statistics

Downloads
31
Abstract Views
1,764