Market Structure in Services and Market Access in Goods

IIIS Working Paper No. 80

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. TI 2004-050/2

23 Pages Posted: 16 Jun 2004

See all articles by Joseph F. Francois

Joseph F. Francois

University of Bern - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Vienna Institute of International Economic Studies (WIIW); University of Adelaide - School of Economics

Ian Wooton

University of Strathclyde - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 2006

Abstract

We examine interaction between trade in goods and market power in domestic trade and distribution, developing a model that highlights this interaction. Theory points to an expected linkage between service sector competition and goods trade, one supported by econometrics involving import patterns of 21 OECD countries vis-a-vis 86 trading partners. This points to significant linkages between effective market access conditions for goods and the structure of the service sector. Because of the implied interaction, ignoring the structure of the domestic service sector may lead to a substantial underestimation of the direct impact of tariffs on trade flows.

Keywords: Market access, services trade, trade liberalization, competition policy, imperfect competition, GATS

JEL Classification: F12, F13, F23

Suggested Citation

Francois, Joseph F and Wooton, Ian, Market Structure in Services and Market Access in Goods (June 2006). IIIS Working Paper No. 80; Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. TI 2004-050/2. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=539502 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.539502

Joseph F Francois (Contact Author)

University of Bern - Department of Economics ( email )

Schanzeneckstrasse 1
Bern, CH-3001
Switzerland

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Vienna Institute of International Economic Studies (WIIW) ( email )

Oppolzergasse 6
A-1010 Vienna
Austria

University of Adelaide - School of Economics ( email )

Adelaide SA, 5005
Australia
+61 8 8303 5540 (Phone)
+61 8 8223 1460 (Fax)

Ian Wooton

University of Strathclyde - Department of Economics ( email )

Sir William Duncan Building
130 Rottenrow
Glasgow G4 0GE
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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