More Order Without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures

Posted: 12 May 2000

See all articles by Peter H. Huang

Peter H. Huang

University of Colorado Law School

Ho-Mou Wu

National Taiwan University - Department of International Business

Abstract

This article applies psychological game theory to study ther maintenance of social order. It models the control of corruption in principal-supervisor-agent relationships. The models possess multiple equilibria, which correspond to certain social norms and organizational cultures or their absence. The models demonstrate how expectations concerning the likeklihood of corrupt behavior can influence decisions to engage in such behavior via the magnitude of endogenous remorse on the part of the actor.

JEL Classification: M14

Suggested Citation

Huang, Peter H. and Wu, Ho-Mou, More Order Without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5412

Peter H. Huang (Contact Author)

University of Colorado Law School ( email )

Colorado Law
401 UCB
Boulder, CO 80309
United States
303 492-4563 (Phone)
303-492-1200 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://lawweb.colorado.edu/profiles/profile.jsp?id=456

Ho-Mou Wu

National Taiwan University - Department of International Business ( email )

50, Lane 144, Section 4, Keelung Road
Taipei 106
Taiwan

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