Union Power, Cost of Job Loss, and Workers' Effort

Industrial and Labor Relations Review, April 1998

Posted: 3 Feb 1998

See all articles by Francis Green

Francis Green

University of Kent - Department of Economics

Steven McIntosh

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)

Abstract

The authors hypothesize that the effectiveness of external threats in raising workers' effort is mediated by, among other labor market conditions, the presence or absence of a powerful union. In particular, they argue that because powerful unions reduce the potency of the external threat of job loss (by making it more difficult for employers to dismiss workers), the pace of work is less responsive to such a threat in strongly unionized plants than in weakly unionized plants. The results of an analysis of data from the 1990 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey in Britain support this hypothesis. The analysis also yields evidence that effort is increased where workers are rewarded individually according to results and where there are various communication channels between workers and management.

JEL Classification: J21, J50, J51, J65

Suggested Citation

Green, Francis and McIntosh, Steven, Union Power, Cost of Job Loss, and Workers' Effort. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, April 1998, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=54243

Francis Green (Contact Author)

University of Kent - Department of Economics ( email )

Keynes College
Kent, CT2 7NP
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.kent.ac.uk/economics/staff/gfg/

Steven McIntosh

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
+44 (0)171 955 7442 (Phone)

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