Corruption, Bribery, and Wait Times in the Public Allocation of Goods in Developing Countries

20 Pages Posted: 11 May 2004

See all articles by Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) - Department of Economics

Seung Jick Yoo

Korea Energy Economics Institute

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 2004

Abstract

What are the nexuses between corruption, bribery, and wait times in the public allocation of goods in developing countries? This question has received scant attention in the literature. Consequently, we use queuing theory to analyze models in which a good is allocated publically, first in a non-preemptive corruption regime and then in a preemptive corruption regime. Specifically, for both regimes, we calculate wait times for citizens who pay bribes and for those who do not. Second, we use these wait times to show that bribery is profitable for citizens with a high opportunity cost of time. Third, we show that high and low opportunity cost of time citizens will have dissimilar preferences as far as the corruption regime is concerned. Finally, we conclude with some across citizens and across corruption regimes observations about the value of preemption, the benefit from bribery, and a measure of resource misallocation in the economy.

Keywords: Bribery, corruption, queuing theory, uncertainty, wait time

JEL Classification: D80, H40, O12

Suggested Citation

Batabyal, Amitrajeet A. and Yoo, Seung Jick, Corruption, Bribery, and Wait Times in the Public Allocation of Goods in Developing Countries (April 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=545022 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.545022

Amitrajeet A. Batabyal (Contact Author)

Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) - Department of Economics ( email )

92 Lomb Memorial Drive
Rochester, NY 14623-5604
United States
585-475-2805 (Phone)
585-475-5777 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://people.rit.edu/aabgsh

Seung Jick Yoo

Korea Energy Economics Institute ( email )

665-1 Naeson2-dong
Euiwang-si
Kyunggi-Do 437-082
Korea

HOME PAGE: http://www.rit.edu/~aabgsh/

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