Optimal War and Jus Ad Bellum

42 Pages Posted: 13 May 2004

See all articles by Eric A. Posner

Eric A. Posner

University of Chicago - Law School

Alan Sykes

Stanford University - Law School

Date Written: April 2004

Abstract

The laws of war forbid states to use force against each other except in self-defense or with the authorization of the United Nations Security Council. Self-defense is usually understood to mean self-defense against an imminent threat. We model the decision of states to use force against "rogue" states, and argue that under certain conditions it may be proper to expand the self-defense exception to preemptive self-defense. We also consider related issues such as humanitarian intervention, collective security, and the role of the Security Council.

Keywords: laws of war, United Nations

Suggested Citation

Posner, Eric A. and Sykes, Alan, Optimal War and Jus Ad Bellum (April 2004). U Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 211; U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 63. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=546104 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.546104

Eric A. Posner (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Law School ( email )

1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-0425 (Phone)
773-702-0730 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-e/

Alan Sykes

Stanford University - Law School ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

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