Merger Performance Under Uncertain Efficiency Gains
41 Pages Posted: 11 Jun 2004
Date Written: May 2004
In view of the uncertainty over the ability of merging firms to achieve efficiency gains, we model the post-merger situation as a Cournot oligopoly wherein the outsiders face uncertainty about the merged entity's final cost. At the Bayesian equilibrium, a bilateral merger is profitable provided that non-merged firms sufficiently believe that the merger will generate large enough efficiency gains, even if ex post none actually materialize. The effects of the merger on market performance are shown to follow similar threshold rules. The findings are broadly consistent with stylized facts, and provide a rationalization for an efficiency consideration in merger policy.
Keywords: Horizontal merger, Bayesian Cournot equilibrium, Efficiency gains, Market performance
JEL Classification: D43, L11, L22
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation