Take or Leave? Distribution in Asymmetric One-Off Conflict

19 Pages Posted: 4 Jul 2004

See all articles by Anthony de Jasay

Anthony de Jasay

Independent

Werner Güth

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; Luiss Guido Carli University

No Name

University of Giessen

Axel Ockenfels

University of Cologne - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Abstract

Most social scientists' views of conflict and cooperation in society are shaped by very elementary, one-off, two by two symmetric simultaneous move games like prisoner's dilemma, chicken, assurance or stag hunt. We think that this diet of examples leads to biased accounts in particular of distributional conflict, and therefore suggest that asymmetry in payoffs and move structure be taken into account systematically. In this paper a new paradigm of asymmetric games to study basic distributional conflicts is introduced, illustrated numerically and discussed theoretically. The results of exploratory experiments on the empirical side of the matter are also reported.

Suggested Citation

de Jasay, Anthony and Güth, Werner and Name, No and Ockenfels, Axel, Take or Leave? Distribution in Asymmetric One-Off Conflict. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=546923

Werner Güth

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

Luiss Guido Carli University ( email )

Via O. Tommasini 1
Rome, Roma 00100
Italy

No Name

University of Giessen ( email )

Licher str.
Giessen, 35394
Germany

Axel Ockenfels

University of Cologne - Department of Economics ( email )

Albertus Magnus Platz
Cologne 50923
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://ockenfels.uni-koeln.de/

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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