36 Pages Posted: 9 Jun 2004
Recently, a new concept, the anticommons dilemma, has been introduced in economic literature. In an anticommons property regime, multiple co-owners have the right to exclude one another from benefiting from a common resource. The economic literature has unveiled symmetry between commons and anticommons problems. Our experimental results reveal an interesting asymmetry. Anticommons situations generate greater opportunistic behavior than an equivalent commons dilemma (Study 1), and anticommons dilemmas yield a greater risk for underuse compared to commons dilemmas (Study 2). It was therefore concluded that anticommons might be considered as having even more severe and problematic consequences than the commons dilemma.
Keywords: Property Law
JEL Classification: K00, K11
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Vanneste, Sven and Van Hiel, Alain and Parisi, Francesco and Depoorter, Ben, From 'Tragedy' to 'Disaster': Welfare Effects of Commons and Anticommons Dilemmas. International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, pp. 104-122, 2006; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 04-23; Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-26. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=548622 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.548622