Competitive Location and Pricing on Networks

42 Pages Posted: 28 Jan 1998

See all articles by Daniel Serra

Daniel Serra

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences

Charles ReVelle

Deceased

Abstract

In this paper we consider a location and pricing model for a retail firm that wants to enter a spatial market where a competitor firm is already operating as a monopoly with several outlets. The entering firm seeks to determine the optimal uniform mill price and its servers' locations that maximize profits given the reaction in price of the competitor firm to its entrance. A tabu search procedure is presented to solve the model together with computational experience.

JEL Classification: C61, R32, L81, R12

Suggested Citation

Serra, Daniel and ReVelle (deceased), Charles, Competitive Location and Pricing on Networks. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=54871 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.54871

Daniel Serra (Contact Author)

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
(34) 93 542 16 66 (Phone)
(34) 93 542 17 46 (Fax)

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