Download This PaperInequality, Coalitions and Collective Action
UC Santa Cruz Economics Working Paper No. 570
32 Pages Posted: 13 Jul 2004
Date Written: May 2004
Abstract
In a model where cooperation is beneficial, but subject to cheating, and is supported by trigger strategy punishments in a repeated game, we explore the relationship between the nature of cooperation (size and composition of coalitions) and underlying inequality in the distribution of private productive assets.
Keywords: inequality, self-enforcing, collective action, infrastructure
JEL Classification: C72, D30, D70, O10, P0
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Bardhan, Pranab and Singh, Nirvikar, Inequality, Coalitions and Collective Action (May 2004). UC Santa Cruz Economics Working Paper No. 570, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=550562 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.550562
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