Inequality, Majority Voting and the Redistributive Effects of Public Education Funding

9 Pages Posted: 2 Jul 2004

See all articles by Gerhard Glomm

Gerhard Glomm

Indiana University Bloomington - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Abstract

This paper documents that in poor countries redistribution in cash is negligible. To the extent that public education funding is redistributive, the lion's share of redistribution in poor countries is through public education budgets. I present a simple model of how inequality determines redistribution through public education spending when funding decisions are made through majority voting. Contrary to T. Persson and G. Tabellini, and contrary to conventional wisdom, in the present model higher inequality leads to less redistribution if the curvature in the utility function is sufficiently high. I argue that large curvature of the utility function is empirically relevant.

Suggested Citation

Glomm, Gerhard, Inequality, Majority Voting and the Redistributive Effects of Public Education Funding. Pacific Economic Review, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 93-101, June 2004. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=551222

Gerhard Glomm (Contact Author)

Indiana University Bloomington - Department of Economics ( email )

Wylie Hall
Bloomington, IN 47405-6620
United States
812-855-7256 (Phone)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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