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Business Environment and Firm Entry: Evidence from International Data

63 Pages Posted: 26 May 2004  

Leora F. Klapper

World Bank; World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Luc Laeven

European Central Bank (ECB); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Raghuram G. Rajan

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; International Monetary Fund (IMF); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 2004

Abstract

Using a comprehensive database of firms in Western and Eastern Europe, we study how the business environment in a country drives the creation of new firms. Our focus is on regulations governing entry. We find entry regulations hamper entry, especially in industries that naturally should have high entry. Also, value-added per employee in naturally 'high entry' industries grows more slowly in countries with onerous regulations on entry. Interestingly, regulatory entry barriers have no adverse effect on entry in corrupt countries, only in less corrupt ones. Taken together, the evidence suggests bureaucratic entry regulations are neither benign nor welfare improving. Not all regulations inhibit entry, however. In particular, regulations that enhance the enforcement of intellectual property rights or those that lead to a better developed financial sector do lead to greater entry in industries that do more R&D or industries that need more external finance.

Keywords: Business entry, regulation

JEL Classification: G38, K20, L50, M13

Suggested Citation

Klapper, Leora F. and Laeven, Luc and Rajan, Raghuram G., Business Environment and Firm Entry: Evidence from International Data (April 2004). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4366. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=551502

Leora Klapper

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States
202-473-8738 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/lklapper

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN3-311
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Luc Laeven (Contact Author)

European Central Bank (ECB) ( email )

Sonnemannstrasse 22
Frankfurt am Main, 60314
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom

Raghuram Rajan

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-4437 (Phone)
773-702-0458 (Fax)

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
773-702-9299 (Phone)
773-702-0458 (Fax)

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