Download This PaperIs Acquiring-Firm Shareholder Approval in Stock-for-Stock Mergers Perfunctory?
44 Pages Posted: 2 Jun 2004
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Is Acquiring-Firm Shareholder Approval in Stock-for-Stock Mergers Perfunctory?
Is Acquiring-Firm Shareholder Approval in Stock-for-Stock Mergers Perfunctory?
Date Written: May 2004
Abstract
Despite mixed stock returns for acquirer shareholders in large stock-for-stock mergers, acquiring-firm merger proxy votes rarely fail, and in our sample the average approval out of votes cast exceeds 95%. We seek to determine whether such votes are effective in monitoring management's acquisition policy or are merely perfunctory. We find that the margin of approval varies substantially with firm and deal characteristics. Furthermore, while our sample does not contain failed votes, some deals are only narrowly approved. These findings support the notion that merger proxy votes provide credible threats.
Keywords: Merger proxy votes, mergers and acquisitions
JEL Classification: G34
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Timothy R. Burch (Contact Author)
University of Miami - Department of Finance ( email )
P.O. Box 248094
Coral Gables, FL 33124-6552
United States
305-284-1509 (Phone)
305-284-4800 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.bus.miami.edu/~tburch
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