Signaling, Globality, and the Intuitive Criterion

39 Pages Posted: 8 Jun 2004

See all articles by Christian Ewerhart

Christian Ewerhart

University of Zurich - Department of Economics

Philipp C. Wichardt

University of Rostock - Department of Economics

Date Written: May 2004

Abstract

A global signaling game is a sender-receiver game in which the sender is only imperfectly informed about the receiver's preferences. The paper considers an economically relevant class of signaling games that possess more than one Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. For this class of games, it is shown that a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is unaffected by a small perturbation of the information structure if and only if it is consistent with a criterion suggested by Cho and Kreps (1987). Moreover, the equilibrium in the global signaling game is essentially unique.

Keywords: Global Games, Signaling, Intuitive Criterion

JEL Classification: C72

Suggested Citation

Ewerhart, Christian and Wichardt, Philipp C., Signaling, Globality, and the Intuitive Criterion (May 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=555688 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.555688

Christian Ewerhart (Contact Author)

University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )

Winterthurerstrasse 30
CH-8006 Zurich
Switzerland

Philipp C. Wichardt

University of Rostock - Department of Economics ( email )

Ulmenstr. 69
Rostock, 18057
Germany

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