International Fisheries Agreements: The Feasibility and Impacts of Partial Cooperation

CentER Discussion Paper No. 2003-52

Posted: 9 Jun 2004 Last revised: 25 Aug 2014

See all articles by Kim Hang Pham Do

Kim Hang Pham Do

Massey University

Henk Folmer

University of Groningen

Date Written: 2003

Abstract

This paper deals with partial cooperation among countries involved in the exploitation of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. We analyse the feasibility of coalition structures and their impacts on fishing efforts by means of games in partition function form. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the modified Shapley value is an appropriate device for the division of the gains from cooperation.

Keywords: International fisheries, overexploitation, partial cooperation, games in partition function form, competitive equilibrium, modified Shapley value

Suggested Citation

Pham Do, Kim Hang and Folmer, Henk, International Fisheries Agreements: The Feasibility and Impacts of Partial Cooperation (2003). CentER Discussion Paper No. 2003-52. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=555803

Kim Hang Pham Do (Contact Author)

Massey University ( email )

College of Business
School of Economics and Finance
Palmerston North, Manawatu PN 342
New Zealand
+64 6 3505799, ext. 84056 (Phone)
+64 6 3505660 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.massey.ac.nz/massey/expertise/profile.cfm?stref=705830

Henk Folmer

University of Groningen ( email )

P.O. Box 800
Groningen, 9700AV
Netherlands
+31 503633897 (Phone)

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