Lindahl Equilibrium and Schweizer's Open Club Model with Semi-Public Goods
CentER Discussion Paper No. 2003-56
15 Pages Posted: 11 Jun 2004
Date Written: 2003
Limit core allocations are the ones that remain in the core of a replicated economy. An equivalent notion for economies with public goods is Schweizer's concept of club efficiency under a variable number of economic agents. We extend this notion to economies with goods that have a semi-public nature. We show that given certain conditions, the equivalence of club efficient allocations and Lindahl equilibria holds for a wide range of economies with semi-public club goods. We also show that extension to a more general class of economies seems implausible.
Keywords: Clubs, club efficiency, Lindahl equilibrium, limit cores
JEL Classification: H41, R51, D71
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation