Fixed Tree Games with Repeated Players

CentER Discussion Paper No. 2003-87

15 Pages Posted: 16 Jul 2004

See all articles by Sylvia Miquel

Sylvia Miquel

University of Lleida - Department of Mathematics

Bas van Velzen

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Herbert Hamers

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER); Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research

Henk Norde

Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research; Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research

Date Written: 2003

Abstract

This paper introduces fixed tree games with repeated players (FRP games) which are a generalization of standard fixed tree games. This generalization consists in allowing players to be located in more than one vertex. As a consequence, these players can choose among several ways of connection with the root. In this paper, we show that FRP games are balanced. Moreover, we prove that the core of an FRP game coincides with the core of a related concave fixed tree game. We show how to find the nucleolus, and we characterize the orders which provide marginal vectors in the core of an FRP game.

Keywords: Cooperative game, fixed tree game, core

JEL Classification: C71

Suggested Citation

Miquel, Sylvia and Velzen, Bas van and Hamers, Herbert and Norde, Henk W., Fixed Tree Games with Repeated Players (2003). CentER Discussion Paper No. 2003-87, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=556124 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.556124

Sylvia Miquel (Contact Author)

University of Lleida - Department of Mathematics ( email )

Carrer Jaume II
69 Campus Cappont
Lleida, Catalunya E-25001
Spain

Bas van Velzen

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

No Address Available

Herbert Hamers

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 4666 2660 (Phone)

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Henk W. Norde

Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 466 3245 (Phone)

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research ( email )

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

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