The Filtering Effect of Sharing Rules

32 Pages Posted: 11 Jun 2004

See all articles by Giuseppe Dari‐Mattiacci

Giuseppe Dari‐Mattiacci

Columbia University - Law School

Gerrit De Geest

Washington University in St. Louis - School of Law

Date Written: June 2004

Abstract

Sharing rules have a filtering effect on violations: they prevent the most harmful violations and let the least harmful ones occur. We show under what conditions the filtering effect improves social welfare and argue that this may explain why, in most areas of the law, sharing rules are, in general, preferred to rules that entirely burden one party. Our analysis applies to comparative negligence, communal liability, the allocation of police investigation efforts, contract remedies for non-verifiable breaches such as those that may occur in marriage and employment contracts, and to the distribution of shares in partnerships.

Keywords: comparative negligence, law enforcement, divorce, employment contracts, theory of the firm

JEL Classification: K13

Suggested Citation

Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe and De Geest, Gerrit, The Filtering Effect of Sharing Rules (June 2004). Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1, January 2005; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 04-24. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=556281 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.556281

Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Law School ( email )

435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10025
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.columbia.edu/faculty/giuseppe-dari-mattiacci

Gerrit De Geest

Washington University in St. Louis - School of Law ( email )

Campus Box 1120
St. Louis, MO 63130
United States
314-398-4941 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www,degeest.wustl..edu

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