More is Less: A Law-and-Economics Approach to the International Scope of Private Antitrust Enforcement

24 Pages Posted: 15 Jun 2004

See all articles by Salil K. Mehra

Salil K. Mehra

Temple University - James E. Beasley School of Law

Abstract

Increased international trade has focused attention on the question of who should be allowed to bring United States antitrust claims. As the distinctions between the "United States economy" and the "global economy" have waned, the problem of which international antitrust cases United States courts should hear has waxed. This Article applies a law-and-economics framework to the major arguments in this debate. In particular, this analysis shows how a broader view of subject matter jurisdiction in these cases not only achieves its own claims of superiority in terms of deterrence, but also might better realize the claimed advantage of the narrow view in reducing antitrust litigation. Under certain assumptions, "more" jurisdiction over international cases can lead to "less" litigation.

Keywords: Antitrust, FTAIA, Sherman Act, jurisdiction, international trade

JEL Classification: K21, K33

Suggested Citation

Mehra, Salil K., More is Less: A Law-and-Economics Approach to the International Scope of Private Antitrust Enforcement. Temple Law Review, Spring 2004. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=556295 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.556295

Salil K. Mehra (Contact Author)

Temple University - James E. Beasley School of Law ( email )

1719 North Broad Street
Philadelphia, PA 19122
United States
215-204-7113 (Phone)
215-204-1185 (Fax)

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