Spatial Voting with Endogenous Timing

CentER Discussion Paper No. 2004-10

16 Pages Posted: 24 Jun 2004

See all articles by Steffen Huck

Steffen Huck

University College London - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Vicki Knoblauch

University of Connecticut - Department of Economics

Wieland Müller

University of Vienna, Department of Economics & VCEE; Tilburg University, Department of Economics & CentER

Date Written: 2004

Abstract

We consider a model of (spatial) voting with endogenous timing. In line with what is observed in actual political campaigns, candidates can decide endogenously when and where to locate. More specifically, we analyze endogenous timing in a two-period n-candidate spatial-voting game on the unit interval. We show that this game possesses a pure strategy equilibrium. The equilibrium concept is a simplified version of subgame perfection defined by Osborne (1993) for use in games that possess no - or only very complex - subgame perfect equilibria. We demonstrate the latter point by also analyzing the subgame perfect equilibria in three-candidate spatial voting with endogenous timing. Our results show that accounting for endogenous timing can eliminate some of the more unappealing equilibrium characteristics of the standard model.

Keywords: Voting, political economy, games, general equilibrium

Suggested Citation

Huck, Steffen and Knoblauch, Vicki and Müller, Wieland, Spatial Voting with Endogenous Timing (2004). CentER Discussion Paper No. 2004-10. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=556967 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.556967

Steffen Huck (Contact Author)

University College London - Department of Economics ( email )

Gower Street
London WC1E 6BT, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom
+44 207 679 5895 (Phone)
+44 207 916 2774 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctpshu/

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Vicki Knoblauch

University of Connecticut - Department of Economics ( email )

365 Fairfield Way, U-1063
Storrs, CT 06269-1063
United States
860-486-9076 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.uconn.edu/knoblauch/knoblauchvita.pdf

Wieland Müller

University of Vienna, Department of Economics & VCEE ( email )

Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1
Vienna, A-1090
Austria

HOME PAGE: http://https://homepage.univie.ac.at/wieland.mueller/

Tilburg University, Department of Economics & CentER ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.tilburguniversity.edu/webwijs/show/w.mueller-3.htm

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