Spatial Voting with Endogenous Timing
CentER Discussion Paper No. 2004-10
16 Pages Posted: 24 Jun 2004
Date Written: 2004
We consider a model of (spatial) voting with endogenous timing. In line with what is observed in actual political campaigns, candidates can decide endogenously when and where to locate. More specifically, we analyze endogenous timing in a two-period n-candidate spatial-voting game on the unit interval. We show that this game possesses a pure strategy equilibrium. The equilibrium concept is a simplified version of subgame perfection defined by Osborne (1993) for use in games that possess no - or only very complex - subgame perfect equilibria. We demonstrate the latter point by also analyzing the subgame perfect equilibria in three-candidate spatial voting with endogenous timing. Our results show that accounting for endogenous timing can eliminate some of the more unappealing equilibrium characteristics of the standard model.
Keywords: Voting, political economy, games, general equilibrium
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