Download This PaperCrime Timing
10 Pages Posted: 24 Jun 2004
Abstract
Under a dynamic framework, we find that a profitable crime now may be not optimal and hence, not committed; a not profitable crime now may become optimal in the future. Moreover, if individuals can choose when to commit a crime, underdeterrence will be the optimal law enforcement policy.
Keywords: Economics of crime, law enforcement
JEL Classification: K4
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?
Recommended Papers
-
The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines
-
Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior
By Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell
-
The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment When Wealth is Unobservable
-
The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment When Wealth is Unobservable