Donor Strategy Under the Fungibility of Foreign Aid

19 Pages Posted: 8 Jul 2004

See all articles by Sajal Lahiri

Sajal Lahiri

Southern Illinois University Carbondale - Department of Economics

Pascalis Raimondos

Queensland University of Technology - School of Economics and Finance; Copenhagen Business School - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Abstract

We develop a political-economic model of aid fungibility: a part of aid is diverted away from its intended target by lobby groups. The size of this diversion - the degree of aid fungibility - is determined endogenously by the recipient government. The donor can affect the equilibrium degree of fungibility by choosing both the size of aid and the timing of its decision. We derive a condition under which the donor's reaction to fungibility is to reduce the amount of aid. Under this condition, if the donor acts as a follower, both the donor and the target group are better off.

Suggested Citation

Lahiri, Sajal and Raimondos, Pascalis, Donor Strategy Under the Fungibility of Foreign Aid. Economics & Politics, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 213-231, July 2004. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=558831

Sajal Lahiri (Contact Author)

Southern Illinois University Carbondale - Department of Economics ( email )

MC 415
1000 Faner Drive
Carbondale, IL 62901
United States

Pascalis Raimondos

Queensland University of Technology - School of Economics and Finance ( email )

GPO Box 2434
2 George Street
Brisbane, Queensland 4001
Australia

Copenhagen Business School - Department of Economics ( email )

Solbjergs Plads 3
DK-2000 Frederiksberg C
Denmark
+45 38 152 594 (Phone)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
25
Abstract Views
1,048
PlumX Metrics