Re-Examining the Effects of Regulation Fair Disclosure Using Foreign Listed Firms to Control for Concurrent Shocks

53 Pages Posted: 19 Aug 2004

See all articles by Jennifer Francis

Jennifer Francis

Duke University

Dhananjay Nanda

University of Miami - Department of Accounting

Xin Wang

The University of Hong Kong

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 2004

Abstract

We re-examine prior studies' findings concerning the effects of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) on properties of US firms' information environments. Our study's innovation is the identification of a sample of industry- and size-matched foreign listed firms (ADRs) explicitly exempt from the provisions of Reg FD. We use the ADR sample to control for events occurring at the same time as Reg FD and which affected all traded firms' information environments. Specifically, by examining the relative difference in changes in pre- versus post- information proxies for US versus ADR firms, we provide a more powerful test of effects unique to Reg FD. Across all tests, we find that US firms' information environments changed no more nor no less than those of ADRs, suggesting that Reg FD itself had little effect on the aspects of US firms' environments we consider.

Keywords: Reg FD, foreign-listed firms. information environment

JEL Classification: M41, M45, M47, G38

Suggested Citation

Francis, Jennifer and Nanda, Dhananjay and Wang, Xin, Re-Examining the Effects of Regulation Fair Disclosure Using Foreign Listed Firms to Control for Concurrent Shocks (June 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=560721 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.560721

Jennifer Francis (Contact Author)

Duke University ( email )

220 Allen Building
Durham, NC 27705
United States

Dhananjay Nanda

University of Miami - Department of Accounting ( email )

Coral Gables, FL 33146-6531
United States

Xin Wang

The University of Hong Kong ( email )

1215 K.K.Leung Building
Hong Kong
Hong Kong

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