Who Buys and Who Sells Options: The Role of Options in a General Equilibrium Model with Background Risk

Posted: 20 Jul 1998

See all articles by Guenter Franke

Guenter Franke

University of Konstanz - Department of Economics

Richard C. Stapleton

University of Strathclyde - Department of Accounting and Finance

Marti G. Subrahmanyam

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business; NYU Shanghai

Date Written: May 1994

Abstract

In this paper, we derive an equilibrium in which some investors buy call/put options on an asset while others sell them. Also, some investors supply and others demand forward contracts. Since investors are assumed to have similar risk-averse preferences, the demand for these contracts is not explained by differences in the shape of the utility functions. Rather, it is the degree to which agents face other, non-hedgeable, background risks that determines their hedging behavior in the model. For example, a privately- held firm exposed to foreign exchange risk may have profits which also depend on non-hedgeable risks in specific product markets. Our model suggests that the degree to which the firm will hedge the foreign exchange risk depends on the level of firm-specific risk to which it is subject. We show that investors with low or no background risk sell portfolio insurance, i.e., they sell options on the market portfolio, whereas investors with high background risk buy those options. A general increase in background risk in the economy reduces the forward price of the market portfolio. Also, the price of put options rises and the price of call options falls. However, in an economy with given background risk, all options will be overpriced if the option pricing model ignores the background risk.

JEL Classification: G13

Suggested Citation

Franke, Guenter and Stapleton, Richard C. and Subrahmanyam, Marti G., Who Buys and Who Sells Options: The Role of Options in a General Equilibrium Model with Background Risk (May 1994). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5612

Guenter Franke

University of Konstanz - Department of Economics ( email )

Fach 147
Konstanz, 78457
Germany
+49 7531 88 2545 (Phone)
+49 7531 88 3559 (Fax)

Richard C. Stapleton

University of Strathclyde - Department of Accounting and Finance ( email )

Curran Building
100 Cathedral Street
Glasgow G4 0LN
United Kingdom
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+44 1524 846874 (Fax)

Marti G. Subrahmanyam (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )

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Suite 9-160
New York, NY NY 10012
United States

NYU Shanghai ( email )

1555 Century Ave
Shanghai, 200122
China

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