The Politics of EU Eastern Enlargement: Evidence from a Heckman Selection Model

British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 17-38, January 2006

40 Pages Posted: 6 Jul 2004 Last revised: 24 Oct 2011

See all articles by Thomas Pluemper

Thomas Pluemper

Vienna University of Economics and Business - Department of Socioeconomics; University of Essex - Department of Government

Christina J. Schneider

University of California, San Diego; Max Planck Institute for Economics

Vera E. Troeger

University of Essex - Department of Government

Date Written: May 14, 2004

Abstract

This paper perceives the politics of EU eastern enlargement to be a twofold process, in which governments of transition countries decide whether or not to apply for membership and in turn EU members decide whether or not to accept these applicants. Specifically, we argue that the level of democracy and the extent of market reforms together determine the first decision, while the second decision is largely determined by the EU observing the reform process in applicant countries imposed by the acquis communautaire conditionality. The natural procedure to test this theory is a Heckman selection model. We use a Heckman specification with panel probit estimators in both stages. The data supports our argument that uncontested reforms signal the policy support of relevant political parties to the EU and increase the likelihood of joining the Union. We also test for specification errors and check the robustness of our findings.

Keywords: International Unions, Enlargement, Transition, Heckman Panel Probit

JEL Classification: H77, P33, C23

Suggested Citation

Plümper, Thomas and Schneider, Christina J. and Troeger, Vera E., The Politics of EU Eastern Enlargement: Evidence from a Heckman Selection Model (May 14, 2004). British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 17-38, January 2006. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=561362 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.561362

Thomas Plümper (Contact Author)

Vienna University of Economics and Business - Department of Socioeconomics ( email )

Vienna
Austria

University of Essex - Department of Government ( email )

Wivenhoe Park
Colchester, Essex CO4 3SQ
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.polsci.org/pluemper

Christina J. Schneider

University of California, San Diego

9500 Gilman Drive
Mail Code 0502
La Jolla, CA 92093-0112
United States

Max Planck Institute for Economics ( email )

Kahlaische Strasse 10
D-07745 Jena, 07745
Germany

Vera E. Troeger

University of Essex - Department of Government ( email )

Wivenhoe Park
Colchester CO4 3SQ, CO4 3SQ
United Kingdom

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