Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement When There are Criminal Teams

16 Pages Posted: 11 Jul 2004

See all articles by Eberhard Feess

Eberhard Feess

Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinn├╝tzige GmbH

Markus Walzl

RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics)

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Abstract

We extend the analysis of self-reporting schemes to criminal teams. When the violators behave non-cooperatively, maximum deterrence can be reached at virtually no cost by designing a prisoners' dilemma. One drawback of such a scheme is that it might induce cooperative behaviour in the self-reporting stage. If the cooperation rate is increasing the benefits from cooperation, it is optimal to impose less than the maximum fine if both individuals self-report. The same result occurs for imperfect self-reporting technologies where the conviction of one agent does not necessarily lead to a conviction of his accomplice.

Suggested Citation

Feess, Eberhard and Walzl, Markus, Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement When There are Criminal Teams. Economica, Vol. 71, No. 283, pp. 333-348, August 2004. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=562267

Eberhard Feess (Contact Author)

Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinn├╝tzige GmbH ( email )

Adickesallee 32-34
Frankfurt am Main, 60322
Germany

Markus Walzl

RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics) ( email )

Aachen, 52056
Germany
0049 241 809 6157 (Phone)
0049 241 809 2345 (Fax)

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