On Equilibria in Duopolies with Finite Strategy Spaces

UPF Economics and Business Working Paper No. 701

20 Pages Posted: 10 Jul 2004

See all articles by Kalyan Talluri

Kalyan Talluri

Imperial College Business School

Date Written: July 2004

Abstract

We will call a game a reachable (pure strategy) equilibria game if starting from any strategy by any player, by a sequence of best-response moves we are able to reach a (pure strategy) equilibrium. We give a characterization of all finite strategy space duopolies with reachable equilibria. We describe some applications of the sufficient conditions of the characterization.

Keywords: Duopoly, equilibria, revenue management, discrete-choice theory

JEL Classification: C0, D4, C7

Suggested Citation

Talluri, Kalyan, On Equilibria in Duopolies with Finite Strategy Spaces (July 2004). UPF Economics and Business Working Paper No. 701, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=562945 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.562945

Kalyan Talluri (Contact Author)

Imperial College Business School ( email )

387A Business School
South Kensington Campus
London, London SW7 2AZ
United Kingdom
+44 (0)20 7594 1233 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.imperial.ac.uk/people/kalyan.talluri

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
60
Abstract Views
509
rank
385,047
PlumX Metrics