Party Formation and Coalitional Bargaining in a Model of Proportional Representation

47 Pages Posted: 10 Sep 2004

See all articles by Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay

Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay

University of Birmingham - Department of Economics

Mandar P. OAK

Williams College - Department of Economics

Date Written: June 2004

Abstract

We study a game theoretic model of a parliamentary democracy under proportional representation where 'citizen candidates' form parties, voting occurs and governments are formed. We study the coalition governments that emerge as functions of the parties' seat shares, the size of the rents from holding office and their ideologies. We show that governments may be minimal winning, minority or surplus. Moreover, coalitions may be 'disconnected.' We then look at how the coalition formation game affects the incentives for party formation. Our model explains the diverse electoral outcomes seen under proportional representation and integrates models of political entry with models of coalitional bargaining.

Keywords: Proportional representation, Party formation, Coalitions

JEL Classification: C72, D72, H19

Suggested Citation

Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha and Oak, Mandar P., Party Formation and Coalitional Bargaining in a Model of Proportional Representation (June 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=563301 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.563301

Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay (Contact Author)

University of Birmingham - Department of Economics ( email )

Economics Department
Birmingham, B15 2TT
United Kingdom

Mandar P. Oak

Williams College - Department of Economics ( email )

Fernald House
Williamstown, MA 01267
United States
413-597-2300 (Phone)
413-597-4045 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.williams.edu/Economics/oak/cv.htm

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