The Role of Venture Capitalists in the Acquisition of Private Companies

51 Pages Posted: 23 Feb 2007

See all articles by Paul A. Gompers

Paul A. Gompers

Harvard Business School - Finance Unit; Harvard University - Entrepreneurial Management Unit; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Yuhai Xuan

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Finance

Date Written: May 8, 2006

Abstract

In this paper, we examine the characteristics of acquisition of private firms by public companies and explore the impact that venture capital-backing has on the acquirer's characteristics, form of payment, announcement returns, as well as long-run stock price and operating performance. We find that compared to the acquirers of other private companies, those firms that acquire private venture capital-backed companies tend to be larger, have higher Tobin's Q, and are more likely to use equity in the transaction and buy companies in a related industry. The market tends to react more negative to announcement of the acquisition of a venture capital-backed company, but the long-run stock market and operating performance is superior than other private acquisitions. We find that the use of stock and related transaction predicts better long-run performance. Our results suggest that the acquirers of private venture capital-backed companies do not suffer any adverse selection problem and continue to have superior performance in the long-run.

Keywords: Venture capital, mergers and acquisitions, private companies

JEL Classification: G24, G34

Suggested Citation

Gompers, Paul A. and Xuan, Yuhai, The Role of Venture Capitalists in the Acquisition of Private Companies (May 8, 2006). AFA 2008 New Orleans Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=563822 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.563822

Paul A. Gompers

Harvard Business School - Finance Unit ( email )

Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-495-6297 (Phone)
617-496-8443 (Fax)

Harvard University - Entrepreneurial Management Unit ( email )

Cambridge, MA 02163
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Yuhai Xuan (Contact Author)

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Finance ( email )

1206 South Sixth Street
Champaign, IL 61820
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.business.illinois.edu/yhxuan/

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