Stochastic Evolution of Rules for Playing Normal Form Games
UPF Economics and Business Working Paper No. 761
24 Pages Posted: 12 Jul 2004
Date Written: June 2004
Abstract
The evolution of boundedly rational rules for playing normal form games is studied within stationary environments of stochastically changing games. Rules are viewed as algorithms prescribing strategies for the different normal form games that arise. It is shown that many of the folk results of evolutionary game theory typically obtained with a fixed game and fixed strategies carry over to the present case. The results are also related to recent experiments on rules and games.
Keywords: Rules, evolutionary dynamics, stochastic dynamics, bounded rationality, learning, normal form games
JEL Classification: C72, C73, D81, D83
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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