Incentives and Workers' Motivation in the Public Sector

28 Pages Posted: 13 Jul 2004

See all articles by Josse Delfgaauw

Josse Delfgaauw

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics; Tinbergen Institute

Robert Dur

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics; Tinbergen Institute; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 2004

Abstract

Civil servants have a bad reputation of being lazy. However, citizens' personal experiences with civil servants appear to be significantly better. We develop a model of an economy in which workers differ in laziness and in public service motivation, and characterise optimal incentive contracts for public sector workers under different informational assumptions. When civil servants' effort is unverifiable, lazy workers find working in the public sector highly attractive and may crowd out workers with a public service motivation. When effort is verifiable, the government optimally attracts motivated workers as well as the economy's laziest workers by offering separating contracts, which are both distorted. Even though contract distortions reduce aggregate welfare, a majority of society may be better off as public goods come at a lower cost.

Keywords: public sector labour markets, incentive contracts, work ethics, public service motivation

JEL Classification: H1, J3, J4, L3, M5

Suggested Citation

Delfgaauw, Josse and Dur, Robert, Incentives and Workers' Motivation in the Public Sector (June 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=564162 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.564162

Josse Delfgaauw

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

Robert Dur (Contact Author)

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Department of Economics ( email )

FEW / H 8-15
P.O. Box 1738
Rotterdam, 3000 DR
Netherlands
+31-10-4082159 (Phone)
+31-10-4089161 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://people.few.eur.nl/dur

Tinbergen Institute

Amsterdam/Rotterdam
Netherlands

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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