Are Damages Caps Regressive? A Study of Malpractice Jury Verdicts

Posted: 18 Jul 2004

See all articles by David M. Studdert

David M. Studdert

Harvard University - T.H. Chan School of Public Health

Y. Tony Yang

George Washington University

Michelle M. Mello

Stanford Law School; Department of Medicine

Abstract

Caps on damages have emerged as the most common legislative response to the new malpractice crisis; they are also the most controversial. Critics decry caps as unfair, yet surprisingly little is known about the specific circumstances in which they are applied. We analyzed a sample of high-end jury verdicts in California that were subjected to the state's $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages. We found strong evidence that the cap's fiscal impact was distributed inequitably across different types of injuries. Considering the average impact of the cap in absolute dollar terms, the reductions imposed on grave injury were seven times larger than those for minor injury. In proportional terms, the largest reductions occurred for injuries in which the harm centered on pain and disfigurement. We found no evidence that women or the elderly were disparately impacted by the cap. Use of sliding scales of damages instead of or in conjunction with caps would mitigate their adverse impacts on fairness.

Suggested Citation

Studdert, David M. and Yang, Y. Tony and Mello, Michelle M., Are Damages Caps Regressive? A Study of Malpractice Jury Verdicts. Health Affairs, July-August 2004, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=565821

David M. Studdert (Contact Author)

Harvard University - T.H. Chan School of Public Health ( email )

677 Huntington Avenue
Department of Health Policy and Management
Boston, MA 02115
United States
617-432-5209 (Phone)
617-432-4494 (Fax)

Y. Tony Yang

George Washington University ( email )

1919 Pennsylvania Ave
Washington, DC 20006
United States

Michelle M. Mello

Stanford Law School ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States
650-725-3894 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://law.stanford.edu/directory/michelle-m-mello/

Department of Medicine ( email )

Center for Health Policy / PCOR
Encina Commons
Stanford, CA 94305
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://profiles.stanford.edu/michelle-mello?tab=bio

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