38 Pages Posted: 25 Jul 2004
This paper investigates whether shareholder lockup agreements in France and Germany mitigate problems of agency and asymmetric information. Despite minimum requirements in terms of the length and percentage of shares locked up, lockup agreements are not only highly diverse across firms but also across the different shareholders of a single firm as most firms have different agreements in place for executives, non-executives and venture capitalists. The diversity across firms and types of shareholders can be explained by firm characteristics - such as the level of uncertainty - as well as the type and importance of each shareholder within the firm.
Keywords: Initial public offerings, lockup agreements, underpricing, asymmetric informa-tion, agency costs, valuation
JEL Classification: G24, G34
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Goergen, Marc and Khurshed, Arif and Renneboog, Luc, Explaining the Diversity in Shareholder Lockup Agreements. Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 254-280, April 2006; ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 48/2004; EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings Paper No. 1469. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=565941