Global Cyberterrorism, Jurisdiction, and International Organization

36 Pages Posted: 22 Jul 2004  

Joel P. Trachtman

Tufts University - The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

Date Written: July 20, 2004

Abstract

This paper analyzes the jurisdictional and organizational facets of international security against cyberterrorism. This is a "nested," iterative, and recursive analysis, which requires assessment or assumptions regarding goals at one level in order to move on to the next level. In order to examine the need for, and potential structure of, international cooperation to combat cyberterrorism, it is necessary first to examine several subsidiary questions. First, to what extent, and in what contexts, is governmental regulation appropriate to combat cyberterrorism? This is the first level of the subsidiarity analysis: is government action necessary? Second, to what extent, and in what contexts, is domestic government, while possibly necessary, insufficient to combat cyberterrorism? This is a second level of subsidiarity analysis: is local regulation sufficient/ is international cooperation necessary? Third, what form shall international cooperation take: should it be in the form of ad hoc or non-legal and non-organizational relationships among states, or should it be in the form of more formal law or organization? Fourth, what should be the content or responsibilities of this more formal law or organization? This paper cannot answer these questions, but it suggests an analytical framework that may be used to address these questions in a broader research project.

Where regulation is called for, the next question is a choice of levels of regulation: sub-national, national, regional, international law or international organization. This paper provides a brief analysis of the problem of allocation of authority - of jurisdiction - over different components of cyberspace, both horizontally and vertically. This analysis is dependent on the particular facts of cyberspace and threats to cybersecurity. This analysis uses tools from property rights theory, regulatory competition theory, and game theory. Next, this paper examines some potential sources of analogy to the international problem of security against cyberterrorism. These sources of analogy include arrangements to control cybercrime, arrangements to control financing of terrorism, and security arrangements for ocean transport.

Keywords: Cybersecurity, international organization, international law, terrorism, cyberterrorism

JEL Classification: H1, H77, K00, K3

Suggested Citation

Trachtman, Joel P., Global Cyberterrorism, Jurisdiction, and International Organization (July 20, 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=566361 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.566361

Joel P. Trachtman (Contact Author)

Tufts University - The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy ( email )

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