Contested Boundaries: Ambiguity and Creativity in the Evolution of German Codetermination

RIETI Discussion Paper No. 04-E-022

32 Pages Posted: 28 Jul 2004

Date Written: July 2004

Abstract

This article examines the role of ambiguity in processes of institutional change. One challenge for understanding institutional change is to overcome the rather "oversocialized" view of action within Institutional theory. Drawing upon recent work in sociology, the paper introduces a non-teleological model of action that stresses the ambiguity of institutionalized beliefs. Ambiguity is then applied to Masahiko Aoki's concept of institutions as "summary representation" of a strategic game. Rather than institutional break down, ambiguity is associated with incremental modes of institutional change through creative reinterpretation and redeployment of old institutions for new purposes. Empirically, the paper applies these considerations to understanding the historical evolution of employee codetermination in Germany. The continuity in formal legal rules of codetermination contrasts with remarkable diversity as an organizational practice-over time, across industrial sectors and between individual firms. Codetermination illustrates how ambiguity originated in political compromise, but also how ambiguous agreement allows scope for institutional innovation. Ambiguity is, thus, central for understanding how codetermination was partially reproduced and partially changed over time.

Keywords: Institutional change, codetermination, Germany

JEL Classification: G34, J53, N83, N84

Suggested Citation

Jackson, Gregory, Contested Boundaries: Ambiguity and Creativity in the Evolution of German Codetermination (July 2004). RIETI Discussion Paper No. 04-E-022. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=569541 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.569541

Gregory Jackson (Contact Author)

Freie Universit├Ąt Berlin ( email )

Boltzmannstrasse 20
D-14195 Berlin, 14195
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.wiwiss.fu-berlin.de/institute/management/jackson/team/gjackson/index.html

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