Payout Policy in the 21st Century

43 Pages Posted: 3 Aug 2004

See all articles by Alon Brav

Alon Brav

Duke University - Fuqua School of Business; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Campbell R. Harvey

Duke University - Fuqua School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

John R. Graham

Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Roni Michaely

University of Geneva - Geneva Finance Research Institute (GFRI); Swiss Finance Institute

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 2005

Abstract

We survey 384 financial executives and conduct in depth interviews with an additional 23 to determine the factors that drive dividend and share repurchase decisions. Our findings indicate that maintaining the dividend level is on par with investment decisions, while repurchases are made out of the residual cash flow after investment spending. Perceived stability of future earnings still affects dividend policy as in Lintner (1956). However, fifty years later, we find that the link between dividends and earnings has weakened. Many managers now favor repurchases because they are viewed as being more flexible than dividends and can be used in an attempt to time the equity market or to increase EPS. Executives believe that institutions are indifferent between dividends and repurchases and that payout policies have little impact on their investor clientele. In general, management views provide little support for agency, signaling, and clientele hypotheses of payout policy. Tax considerations play a secondary role. This is the final working paper version of our 2005 publication in the Journal of Financial Economics.

Keywords: Payout, Dividend policy, Share repurchases, Lintner model

JEL Classification: G35, G32, G34

Suggested Citation

Brav, Alon and Harvey, Campbell R. and Graham, John Robert and Michaely, Roni, Payout Policy in the 21st Century (November 2005). Tuck Contemporary Corporate Finance Issues III Conference Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=571046 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.571046

Alon Brav

Duke University - Fuqua School of Business ( email )

100 Fuqua Drive
Durham, NC 27708-0120
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919-660-2908 (Phone)
919-684-2818 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
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Belgium

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Campbell R. Harvey (Contact Author)

Duke University - Fuqua School of Business ( email )

Box 90120
Durham, NC 27708-0120
United States
919-660-7768 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.duke.edu/~charvey

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

John Robert Graham

Duke University ( email )

Box 90120
Durham, NC 27708-0120
United States
919-660-7857 (Phone)
919-660-8030 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Roni Michaely

University of Geneva - Geneva Finance Research Institute (GFRI) ( email )

40 Boulevard du Pont d'Arve
Geneva 4, Geneva 1211
Switzerland

Swiss Finance Institute

c/o University of Geneva
40, Bd du Pont-d'Arve
CH-1211 Geneva 4
Switzerland

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