Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Low Wages in the Civil Service Cause Corruption?
IMF Working Paper No. 97/73
Posted: 27 Mar 1998
There are 2 versions of this paper
Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Low Wages in the Civil Service Cause Corruption?
IMF Working Paper No. 97/73
Number of pages: 56
Posted: 15 Feb 2006
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1,428
Date Written: 1997
Abstract
This paper develops and tests two efficiency wage models of corruption in the civil service. Under fair wage models, civil service wages are an important determinant of corruption. Under shirking models, the level of wages is of secondary importance, as potential bribes dwarf wage income. The empirical evidence points to a negative relationship between corruption and wages across developing countries. Tests as to the validity of the two different efficiency wage models are inconclusive.
JEL Classification: J38, J41, J45, O57
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Van Rijckeghem, Caroline and Weder, B., Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Low Wages in the Civil Service Cause Corruption? (1997). IMF Working Paper No. 97/73. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=57168
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