Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Low Wages in the Civil Service Cause Corruption?

IMF Working Paper No. 97/73

Posted: 27 Mar 1998

See all articles by Caroline Van Rijckeghem

Caroline Van Rijckeghem

Istanbul Analytics

B. Weder

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 1997

Abstract

This paper develops and tests two efficiency wage models of corruption in the civil service. Under fair wage models, civil service wages are an important determinant of corruption. Under shirking models, the level of wages is of secondary importance, as potential bribes dwarf wage income. The empirical evidence points to a negative relationship between corruption and wages across developing countries. Tests as to the validity of the two different efficiency wage models are inconclusive.

JEL Classification: J38, J41, J45, O57

Suggested Citation

Van Rijckeghem, Caroline and Weder, B., Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Low Wages in the Civil Service Cause Corruption? (1997). IMF Working Paper No. 97/73. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=57168

Caroline Van Rijckeghem (Contact Author)

Istanbul Analytics ( email )

Istanbul
Turkey

B. Weder

affiliation not provided to SSRN

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