State Capture and Controlling Owners of Firms

CEFIR Working Paper No. 42

Posted: 3 Aug 2004

See all articles by Ekaterina Zhuravskaya

Ekaterina Zhuravskaya

Paris School of Economics (PSE)

Evgeny Yakovlev

Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR)

Date Written: June 2004

Abstract

How does the effect "state capture" depend the identity of the captor? We use a dataset on preferential treatment of selected firms by regional legislature and regulatory agencies in transitional Russia to show that the most effective and the least benign captors are "federal oligarchs" i.e., the firms within groups that have representation in more than two regions. Preferential treatments given to the federal oligarchs bring them higher than average benefits in terms of performance boost. Other firms in the region suffer more from capture by the federal oligarchs than when capture is carried out by other firms. In contrast, firms that are controlled by large regional owners do not have a strong effect of preferential treatments on either their own performance or performance of other regional firms.

JEL Classification: P26, P27, D71, D72

Suggested Citation

Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina and Yakovlev, Evgeny, State Capture and Controlling Owners of Firms (June 2004). CEFIR Working Paper No. 42. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=572170

Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (Contact Author)

Paris School of Economics (PSE) ( email )

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France

Evgeny Yakovlev

Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) ( email )

47 Nakhimovsky Prospect, Office #720
117418 Moscow
Russia
+7 095 3105 5002 (Phone)
+7 095 3105 5003 (Fax)

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