Going Public without Governance: Managerial Reputation Effects

Posted: 5 Aug 2004

See all articles by Armando R. Gomes

Armando R. Gomes

Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business School; Washington University in Saint Louis - John M. Olin Business School

Abstract

This paper addresses the agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. This problem is common among public firms in many countries where the legal system does not effectively protect minority shareholders against oppression by controlling shareholders. We show that even without any explicit corporate governance mechanisms protecting minority shareholders, controlling shareholders can implicitly commit not to expropriate them. Stock prices are significantly higher and firms are more likely go public because of this reputation effect. Moreover, insiders divest shares gradually over time, at a rate that is negatively related to the degree of moral hazard.

JEL Classification: G32, G12, D82

Suggested Citation

Gomes, Armando R. and Gomes, Armando R., Going Public without Governance: Managerial Reputation Effects. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=572626

Armando R. Gomes (Contact Author)

Washington University in Saint Louis - John M. Olin Business School ( email )

One Brookings Drive
Campus Box 1133
St. Louis, MO 63130-4899
United States
314-935-4569 (Phone)

Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business School ( email )

One Brookings Drive
Campus Box 1133
St. Louis, MO 63130-4899
United States
314-935-4569 (Phone)