Social Networks and Crime Decisions: The Role of Social Structure in Facilitating Delinquent Behavior

20 Pages Posted: 17 Aug 2004

See all articles by Antoni Calvo-Armengol

Antoni Calvo-Armengol

Autonomous University of Barcelona - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Yves Zenou

Monash University - Department of Economics; Stockholm University; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI); IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Abstract

Delinquents compete with each other in criminal activities but benefit from being friends with other criminals by learning and acquiring proper know-how on the crime business. We study the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of this game in which individuals decide first to work or to become a criminal and then the crime effort provided if criminals. We show that multiple equilibria with different numbers of active criminals and levels of involvement in crime activities may coexist and are only driven by the geometry of the pattern of links connecting criminals.

Suggested Citation

Calvo-Armengol, Antoni and Zenou, Yves, Social Networks and Crime Decisions: The Role of Social Structure in Facilitating Delinquent Behavior. International Economic Review, Vol. 45, No. 3, pp. 939-958, August 2004. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=573005

Antoni Calvo-Armengol (Contact Author)

Autonomous University of Barcelona - Department of Economics ( email )

Campus Bellaterra
Barcelona, 08193
Spain
+34 93 581 3068 (Phone)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Yves Zenou

Monash University - Department of Economics ( email )

Australia

Stockholm University ( email )

Universitetsvägen 10
Stockholm, Stockholm SE-106 91
Sweden

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI) ( email )

P.O. Box 5501
S-114 85 Stockholm
Sweden

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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