Backlash: Social Incentives for Gender Differences in Negotiating Behavior

13 Pages Posted: 22 Aug 2004

See all articles by Hannah Riley Bowles

Hannah Riley Bowles

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS)

Linda Babcock

Carnegie Mellon University - H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management

Lei Lai

Carnegie Mellon University - H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management

Date Written: July 15, 2004

Abstract

Authors demonstrate the potential for backlash against assertive female negotiators in a hiring experiment. Participants were 119 North American undergraduate students who assessed the impression created by a job candidate based on a resume and interview notes. Interview notes indicated whether the candidate was male or female and whether s/he negotiated for special job benefits during the interview. Results reveal a significant interaction effect between gender and negotiating behavior, such that participants judged female candidates who negotiated for benefits to be less hireable than females who did not negotiate or than males in either condition.

Keywords: Gender, backlash, negotiation

JEL Classification: G29

Suggested Citation

Bowles, Hannah Riley and Babcock, Linda C. and Lai, Lei, Backlash: Social Incentives for Gender Differences in Negotiating Behavior (July 15, 2004). IACM 17th Annual Conference Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=573568 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.573568

Hannah Riley Bowles (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )

79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-4717 (Phone)
617-496-2850 (Fax)

Linda C. Babcock

Carnegie Mellon University - H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management ( email )

Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States
412-268-8789 (Phone)
412-268-7036 (Fax)

Lei Lai

Carnegie Mellon University - H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management ( email )

Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States

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